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WHAT IS LAW? REFLECTIONS ON
SURYA P. SINHA'S MONOGRAPH
The latest book written by Surya Prakash Sinha is the first
book on the theory of law' which represents the new era, the
new world order, understood not as a political slogan but as a
new reality in human social evolution. In recent years dramatic
developments have accelerated the long process of social unification. It has become more clear than ever that our contemporary
culture and civilization are indivisible, that every continent and
nation has contributed to the present globalism. It has also become obvious that despite previous independent paths of development, many diverse movements are converging and the new
patterns of evolution of our culture are becoming more cosmopolitan and universalistic than ever.
S. Prakash Sinha is superbly fitted to fulfill one of the most
difficult and important tasks in the juridical scholarship of our
era: to show how close the various world philosophies of law are,
how peoples on all continents and in times have been endeavoring to answer similar questions and why in different circumstances and environments the results are converging.
Professor S. P. Sinha was born in India, but was educated
both in the Orient and in the West. He has lectured in Canada
and in the United States and is familiar with contemporary Europe and Asia. Both cultures are his cultures, both histories are
his histories. The famous maxim of the old humanist: homo sum
nihil humani a me alienum esse puto (I am a man I think that
nothing human is alien to me) is even better applicable to him
than to the classic European sages of previous centuries.
Notwithstanding my reservations about many of Professor
Sinha's theses, I am sure that with his study, a new chapter in
the theory of law and of political and juridical doctrines has
been opened. Globalism in the philosophy of law has become a

1 SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, WHAT IS LAW? THE DIFFERING THEORIES OF JURISPRUDENCE
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fact and its consequences will be manifold. Today no serious author writing about legal theory can afford wholly to neglect
Sinha's example: the global approach with comparisons between
juridical cultures and solutions has become a scholarly necessity.
I would like to explore further two questions which were
posed by Professor Sinha but, I believe, not answered fully by
him:
What is the nature of law and what is the nature and meaning of juridical positivism?
Should Marxism be totally rejected and dismissed?
JuridicalPositivism

1.

The fundamental question of the author of What is Law has
indeed been answered by him, although he underestimates his
own success and therefore he concludes:
The enterprise of defining law, undertaken by the various
theories about law, has attempted to make a universal statement
about law in the manner of defining a physical phenomenon of
nature. It has not been possible to define law satisfactorily in this
manner...2

Professor Prakash Sinha rejects juridical positivism and
presents against it many valid and correct arguments, yet he fails
to deliver a coup de grace to this theory. On the contrary, whenever he criticizes other theories he does it from the positivist.
viewpoint.
Indeed, Professor Sinha has very ably answered the question
posed by the title of his book. I feel impelled to defend Professor
Sinha against unjustified criticism by Sinha. His "self-criticism"
goes too far.
The main source of Sinha's objections against juridical positivism in my opinion derives from his narrow interpretation of
this theory. One should not rely on certain definitions originated
by Thrasymachos and ratified by Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and finally, by the "pure theory" (Reine
Rechtslehre) of Hans Kelsen. One should rather regard juridical
positivism at the end of our century as a huge philosophical tent
under which various positivistic, realistic, and even materialistic
concepts of law can meet, influence, each other, and elaborate
new social and political concepts and norms (including perma2

Id. at 220.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/16

2

1992]

WHAT IS LAW?

nently developing ideas and norms of human rights). Whatever
are the historical differences in legal experience in the West or
East, North or South, whatever are the philosophical interpretations and answers (beginning with the most primitive) to "what is
law," a couple of unshakeable determinations remain:
Certain norms of behavior exist in every political society and
they are enforced by the "public force" or 'political authority";
whatever their names are they constitute juridical norms and
their totality is "law" or "system of law";
Those norms are either sanctioned or instituted by various
forms of political authority;
Every social and political order requires the existence of certain juridical norms, whose observation is enforced by
governments.
The more developed the society is, the more diversified the
functions of its government are and the greater are the requirements of social policy. Sophisticated systems of law must be developed on national and international scales. The convergence between Western and Eastern, capitalist and communist ideas and
attitudes toward law, so well presented by Professor Sinha, testify
to the existence of a generally accepted (apart from ideological,
philosophical, and religious anathemas) concept of law as rules or
norms sanctioned and/or established by governments; they are coercively enforced by the authorities, albeit never consistently, because of contradictory political and economic interests and because of inevitable bureaucratic inefficiency.
Professor Sinha insists that such a definition or understanding of law is not sufficient, it is too vague and sterile. Do we have
any basic, general social ideas better defined? Are they more concrete? In comparison with definitions of justice, equity, equality,
social responsibility, morality, and love of neighbor the positivistic concept of law is wonderfully elaborated, meaningful, precise
and concrete. And the rest is not silence, but the "eternal green
tree of life" (Faust).
The advantages of juridical positivism are well understood
and used by Professor Sinha wherever he criticizes other thinkers.
Let me give three examples:
1. Professor Sinha rightly attacks Maine's claim to the cultural
superiority of European societies over the rest of humanity because of the role played by law in the social organization of European societies.
The primitive societies do in fact possess a phenomenon
which can be called law, if by law is meant the function per-
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formed by it and the attitude of people toward it. It can be said,
as it is by many authropologists, that law is found in such features, evident in primitive societies, as rules of behavior regulating relations of individuals and groups, reciprocity of services
characterized by their obligatory character, obedience, machinery for dispute resolution, such as reconciliation, compensation,
sanctioned vengeance on the part of the person wronged, and so
3
on.
In his attempts to show that Maine is wrong, Professor
Sinha employs the correct positivistic approach which Maine either deliberately misinterpreted or never understood.
2. In the evaluation of the Free Law School (Freie Rechtslehre)
Professor Sinha writes:
The free law argument gives too much power to the judges
with practically no restraints. Thereby, it paves an easy path to
judicial despotism. To say, as Ehrlich does, that judicial decision
is not arbitrary because it is characterized by the principles of
judicial tradition that heeds the past legal records, statutes, judicial decisions, and legal literature, is to ignore the fact that all of
these have to be interpreted and applied as the judge sees fit.
To shift the concern altogether from the substance of law to
the proper selection of judges unduly minimizes the role that law
plays in expressing the collective and dominant values of the
society.'
Once more Professor Sinha asserts that without reasonable,
humanistic, decent, democratic legal provisions neither certainty, the rule of law, legality, freedom, nor democracy can exist. This is one of the fundamental tenets of juridical positivism
which Professor Sinha correctly uses against Free Law theories.
3. About the American "school of realism" Professor Sinha
writes:
The American realists identify the field of law as exclusively
judicial. In doing so they expunge rules and principles. This, however, is an exaggeration of the unimportance of rules and principles. As pointed out below, they do have a role to play.5
' Id. at 153.
' Id. at 170.
* Id. at 184.
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By reducing law to the fact of judicial behavior, American
realism has eliminated any distinction between facts and law'
However, such a distinction does exist both in the legal profession
and in the ordinary usage of language. The distinction needs to be
clarified, not eliminated.'
And here Professor Sinha is also right. Any endeavors to diminish or eliminate legal "rules and principles" or to mix up
"facts and law" must lead to bad social and political results. Using a truly realistic positivistic approach, Professor Sinha has
convincingly attacked "American realism."
The conclusions which one could draw from the review of
these cases are these:
Whenever Professor Sinha criticizes juridical positivism his
criticism is incomplete and he disesteems the role and value of
his own philosophy. Whenever he criticizes other theories of law
he shows how acute and penetrating his mind is. Using positivistic arguments, he convincingly attacks all other doctrines. He really does a very good job and sometimes he sounds more positivistic than the positivists themselves.
Professor Sinha tries to explore one of the crucial jurisprudential questions: to what extent can law be a center or an axis
if not a creative force or the glue holding civilized societies together? How did various people, nations, and cultures in the
past and present assess the specific importance of law? His analyses and comparisons between Chinese, Indian, African and European legal experiences in this respect are impressive and stimulating. I am not so sure that the institution of law was so
central at any period in Western societies or that such a role was
ever attributed to law in any influential theories of law. It seems
that in the last two centuries there were periods when Der
Kampf urns Recht-the struggle for Law-was an especially hot
issue, usually after every defeat of despotism and its lawlessness.
After Stalin's death and Beria's execution even the Soviet communists proclaimed the rule of law and the return to true socialist legality (whatever that meant).
Many social movements and political parties regarded law
as a medicine sure to cure all past or existing ills in periods of
' Id. at 185.
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crisis, despair, and downfall. But their exaggerated expectations
diminished in a relatively short time.
The liberal bourgeois concept of the "Rechtstaat," or the
typical American versions incorporated in the ideal of The Rule
of Law as against the rule of governments or individuals over
people, is as ludicrous and as utopian as the famous prophecy of
Engels that in the future communist society management and
control over things instead of rule over human beings will
prevail.
The liberal communists revived this ideal in their struggle
against real or bureaucratic communism, yet they too were disappointed. They found how right their mentor, Karl Marx, was
when he argued that law can not grow above the economic and
political system and that ultimately law is an instrument in the
hands of the ruling class.
In this way we have approached the question of the Marxian theory of law.
2.

Is the Marxist theory of law entirely wrong and obsolete?

In Sinha's discussion of the Marxist theory two elements are
missing:
(a) He fails to present and analyze the Marxian (not Marxist!) concept of law as the will of the ruling class.
(b) Official Soviet and the neo-liberal or revisionist version
of the philosophy of law.
One should always remember that even during his lifetime
Marx categorically stated: "One thing is sure, I am not a marxist." In a similar spirit many contemporary theologians argue:
"About Jesus, one thing is sure: He was not a Christian."
Marx and Engels regarded law not merely as product of the
"basis," the economic relations, or the type of property, prevailing in a given society. They also connected the content of law
with many forms of the "superstructure," including forms of
state, political institutions, level of popular social consciousness,
prevailing ideology, religion, customs, historical experience,
kinds of professional occupations, urbanization, and finally the
will of the ruling class. In the Communist Manifesto Marx and
Engels wrote the famous words: your law is only the "will of
your class" dignified with the word "law"! This journalistic sentence was elevated by the Soviet ideologues to be the keystone
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of the Marxist theory of law.
It is not the intention of the reviewer to analyze what Marx
and Engels really meant by the expression "the will of your
class." It is obvious that they were under the influence of Jean
Jacques Rousseau's terminology, of the "will of all," and the
"general will." It is clear, however, that they sought to define the
social essence of existing legal systems. According to them every
corpus juris is just one of the tools for securing the privileges of
the stronger (expression of Plato-Thrasymachos), of the master,
but not of the employee (Adam Smith). The Hegelian essence
was never identified by Marx with the wholeness or sum total of
the given concept or institution. Essence should be interpreted
as containing or portraying the most important, basic and indispensable features of a particular phenomenon.
One can state without any exaggeration or simplification
that every system of law, taken in its totality, apart from particular provisions and even wholly accidental legal acts, is a necessary means for preserving the existing economic structure and
social relations. In this sense law is a powerful conservative
force, although sometimes it can help to reform a social and political system in order to make that system more modern, flexible, and progressive. The main political aspect of every system
of law remains unchangeable: the preservation and enforcement
of the existing social and economic status quo.
From the broadest social and political viewpoint that fact
does not mean that a legal system or part of it cannot be a progressive force in the life of a nation. Unfortunately, communist
Marxists all over the world, under the direct influence and pressure of Stalinism, did not understand the complicated dialectics
of social evolution: What is conservative can be a source of progress, what is reformist can be used to strangle new forms of life,
what is irrational can promote a rational awakening, what is rational can be used by dogmatists.
The general ignorance of the dialectics of contradictions was
one of the powerful sources of misunderstanding and misevaluation by both Marxists and anti-Marxists of the nature and real
functions of capitalist and socialist law. Both systems have been
conservative and both have also been undermining in an insidious and treacherous way their own basis and existence.
We see how the transformation of one sentence from the

7

PACE Y.B. INT'L L.

(Vol. 4:429

Communist Manifesto into a lifeless dogma became one of the
ideological gravestones of communism. On the other hand, a reasonable interpretation of the Marxian observation concerning
law combined with the empirical observations can be fruitful
and become one more instrument in the understanding of our
complicated society, full of contradictions and prejudices.
The liberals and revisionists in the communist countries
started their attacks against the official theory of socialist state
and law from two points:
The fact that a law may essentially be progressive does not
by itself mean that every legal provision and institution must be
humanistic, reasonable, and progressive;
Every individual, constitutional, and social right, including
human rights, must be secured by various legal, social and institutional guarantees in order to be really observed and realized.
It seems that these concepts can still serve in the contemporary post-communist world.
CONCLUSION

The book of Surya Prakash Sinha is a great contribution to
political and legal philosophy. It is a convincing presentation of
anti-racism in scholarly practice. His global approach is a meaningful rejection of all types of nationalistic exclusiveness and
megalomania. Without mentioning nazi and bolshevik, white
and black nationalism, it is a textbook on how to avoid the
poison ivy of racism.
Sinha's book has elevated the eternal discussion: what is
law?
Mieczyslaw Maneli
Professor of Law and Political Science
Chairman of the Council for the study
of Ethics and Public Policy,
Queens College, CUNYt
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